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Abstract 
Developed countries face the risk of a sustained lack of aggregate demand, i.e. secular 
stagnation. Demand-oriented growth models emphasizing the balance-of-payments constraint 
raise concerns about attendant adverse growth impacts on developing countries from reduced 
export growth. These concerns are well-founded, albeit less serious than the simplest version 
of these models would imply. Relaxing their assumptions and emphasizing cumulative 
causation forces from domestic-demand growth and relative price effects indicates how 
changed policies can maintain rapid growth while reducing the import content of demand. 
Crucial is investment that reduces gaps between the composition of domestic production and 
domestic demand and emphasizes sectors with cumulative-causation effects, combined with 
incomes policy and capital-account management. Drawing down excessive foreign-exchange 
reserves and obtaining concessionary loans from development banks can finance required 
capital-goods imports. Enhanced South-South integration may be an important complement 
for small countries. 
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1. Introduction 
Seven years after the onset of the global financial crisis, the growth path of the world 
economy remains on noticeably lower levels than before the crisis. Many developed countries 
continue to lack robust demand growth and experience inflation significantly below targeted 
rates, despite several years of accommodative monetary policy, improved financial conditions 
and some relaxation of fiscal consolidation. Developing countries maintained rapid growth up 
to 2010–2011 through the adoption of countercyclical policies, which raised domestic 
demand and mitigated declining growth stimuli from the external economic environment. 
However, these policies have been gradually unwound as many developing countries have 
experienced pressure on domestic prices or trade balances that could be contained only by 
accepting lower domestic demand growth. The emphasis of the development literature on the 
importance of developed-country growth for developing-country growth indicates that 
developing countries may experience a progressive downward slide of growth if the lack of 
aggregate demand in developed countries persists. 
Concerns that economic growth in developed countries will remain weak for a protracted 
period of time have been summarized as “secular stagnation”, i.e. an extended period of low 
growth reflecting persistently weak demand that could turn into stagnation because weak 
actual output growth reinforces the erosion of potential output growth. There is no agreement 
as to whether the current economic situation in developed countries actually reflects secular 
stagnation (for discussion see, e.g. Teulings and Baldwin, 2014). Yet, the risk of protracted 
subdued demand growth in these economies and the spillover effects of policies that 
developed countries may adopt to address this phenomenon provide enough reason for 
developing countries to consider a response to diminished prospects for export-led growth. 
The paper’s main contributions are its focus on the impact that secular stagnation may have 
on developing countries’ growth prospects and its use of a unified framework based on two 
traditions that emphasize the role of exports in economic growth. These are the growth model 
based on the balance-of-payments constraint (Thirlwall, 1979), which underlines the 
relationship between imports and exports in the growth process, and the model of cumulative 
causation (Kaldor, 1970; Myrdal, 1957), which emphasizes the positive association between 
growth of a country’s GDP and that of its manufacturing sector. 
The paper’s main argument is that concerns raised by models emphasizing the balance-of-
payments constraint about developing countries’ growth prospects are well-founded, albeit 
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less serious than the simplest version of the model would imply. Changing assumptions to 
emphasize cumulative causation forces from domestic-demand growth and allow for relative 
price effects indicate that developing countries can maintain rapid growth by compensating 
for lower export growth by faster domestic-demand growth, provided that they can also 
reduce the import content of demand. Achieving this requires changing policies towards a 
focus on investment that moves the composition of domestic production closer to the 
emerging composition of domestic demand and emphasizes sectors that are sufficiently large 
to enjoy cumulative-causation effects. Such investment should be accompanied by incomes 
policy and capital-account management. Drawing down excessive foreign-exchange reserves 
or obtaining concessionary loans from development banks could provide the financing for 
capital-goods imports that some developing countries may require. Resource-based 
economies will find growth rebalancing more challenging than those that have developed 
manufacturing during periods of export-led growth. Small countries may require further 
growth support from enhanced South-South integration. Rebalancing developing countries’ 
growth strategies will be complicated if developed countries continue addressing the risk of 
secular stagnation by relying on monetary expansion and/or if their policies involve shifting 
the composition of their aggregate demand towards a greater importance of external demand. 
The next section discusses the risk of secular stagnation in developed countries, its potential 
reasons and attendant policy options. Section 3 examines the relationship between developed-
country and developing-country growth from the perspective of growth models and combines 
two demand-oriented models to consider the channels through which this relationship works. 
Section 4 discusses policy responses by developing countries, and section 5 concludes. 
 
2. The risk of secular stagnation in developed countries 
The hypothesis of “secular stagnation” describes the risk that very sluggish economic growth 
becomes the new norm in developed countries because their traditional macroeconomic 
toolkit, and especially monetary policy, becomes ineffective (Summers, 2014a and b; 
Krugman, 2014a).
1
 It asserts that the financial crisis of 2007–2008 was a second-order event 
                                                 
1
 The term “secular stagnation” was coined by Hansen (1939) who worried that the United States was facing 
slowing demographic and labour-force growth combined with constraints on farmland expansion that would 
generate under-investment and aggregate demand deficiency that would cause economic growth to decline to 
very slow rates. While fiscal expansion related to World War II and accelerated population growth during the 
1950s prevented Hansen’s concern to materialize, the hypothesis that global economic recovery over the past 
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and that the main culprit for the slow recovery from the crisis has been a decade-long 
tendency of inadequate aggregate demand growth.
2
 The United States has addressed the 
resulting adverse effects on output growth by successive waves of accommodative monetary 
policy. Each of these episodes allowed demand gaps to be compensated temporarily by an 
unsustainable debt-fuelled expansion of consumption spending based on easier access to 
loans and the wealth effects of asset price bubbles.
3
 Other large developed countries, such as 
Germany and Japan, have supported domestic aggregate demand by large trade surpluses. 
The current situation where accommodative monetary policy is hitting the zero-interest-rate 
bound and facing a liquidity trap makes it increasingly difficult to generate the effects needed 
to restore full employment and rapid growth through the usual macroeconomic toolkit. This is 
the case not only for the United States, where monetary expansion would aim at lower output 
gaps, but also for Germany (or the Euro-area more generally) and Japan, where monetary 
expansion would tackle very low inflation. Taken together, policymakers in developed 
countries, and especially the United States, are facing a trade-off between accepting 
prolonged sluggish output growth and creating ever greater asset market bubbles, unless they 
successfully address the root causes of secular stagnation. 
Among the various causes given for secular stagnation (see, e.g. Summers, 2014a; Teulings 
and Baldwin, 2014), three relate to reduced long-term potential growth that is holding back 
current fixed capital investment: (i) the slower growth of the labour force, due to both a 
declining rate of population growth and a decline in labour force participation, which requires 
less capital to equip workers; (ii) structural changes in production processes causing 
technologically leading enterprises to operate on lower capital-output ratios and reduce their 
expenditure on fixed investment; and (iii) the decline in the relative prices of capital goods so 
                                                                                                                                                        
seven years has been held back by deficient aggregate demand has revived interest in this issue. For a review on 
the diagnosis, causes and possible remedies of secular stagnation, see e.g. Teulings and Baldwin (2014). 
2
 IMF (2014) considers the period of secular stagnation to have begun in the mid-1980s, when real interest rates 
in developed countries started to decline following the adoption of disinflationary policies in these countries. 
However, the mid-1980s also mark the beginning of the long-run decline of the wage share in developed 
countries (ILO, 2015). Disinflationary policies may be at the origin of this decline as they became theoretically 
justifiable following the growing attention given during the 1970s and 1980s to New Classical Macroeconomics 
that, as opposed to Keynesian economics, asserts that only the aggregate price level and labour market 
flexibility, and not aggregate demand, have an impact on output and employment growth.  
3
 Though adopted for different reasons, the fiscal expansion in the form of tax cuts during 2001–2003 also 
helped staving off a deep recession in the United States following the dot-com crash in 2000. 
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that purchasing a given unit of such goods implies lower levels of fixed investment 
expenditure.
4
 
Two additional factors have been identified as causing a lack of aggregate demand that, in 
turn, holds back actual output growth and further reduces current fixed capital investment. 
First, in his hypothesis of a balance-sheet recession, Koo (2013) argues that the current 
ineffectiveness of monetary policy in removing the shortage of aggregate demand results 
from the focus of highly indebted private firms and households on paying down their debt, 
and their resulting unwillingness to borrow even when interest rates fall. While sensible at the 
individual level, such a strategy of minimizing debt causes an enduring lack of aggregate 
demand at the macroeconomic level if the new savings fail to create new investment or 
consumption expenditure. This factor may primarily apply to immediate post-crisis periods, 
but its effects can extend for prolonged period of times if, as currently the case, slow income 
recovery and very low inflation rates retard the deleveraging process. 
Second, distributional changes, both between labour and capital income and between those 
with more wealth and those with less, imply a decline in the share of income that goes to 
those with a higher propensity to spend and a lower propensity to save. In this situation, 
avoiding a decline in aggregate demand growth requires a trade surplus, fiscal expansion or 
increased borrowing to boost debt-financed consumer spending.
5
 This view (e.g. Stiglitz, 
2012: 85) identifies the deep cause of secular stagnation not so much as a liquidity trap but 
rather as income stagnation. It argues that the decline in the wage share in developed 
countries by about ten percentage points since the 1980s has considerably constrained 
income-based consumer demand with attendant adverse effects on private investment. These 
adverse demand effects from worsened functional income distribution have been reinforced 
by (i) worsened personal income distribution, as the share in total income of the richest 
households has strongly increased and that of middle-class households decreased, and (ii) 
reliance of policies adopted to address the demand shortfall on monetary expansion, as this 
                                                 
4
 Gordon (2014) argues that slowing economic potential relates to a reduced pace of technological progress as 
rapid productivity growth during the period 1930–1980 was exceptional and is likely to decline back to its 
relative low historical norm, so that the growth contribution of technological progress is unlikely to increase. 
While this concept is often confused as providing a further reason for secular stagnation, it is a supply-side 
concept, while secular stagnation is a demand-side concept (Krugman, 2014a). 
5
 To the extent that an individual’s savings behaviour is well explained by life-time consumption smoothing, 
excess savings stemming from distributional changes may have been accentuated by the aging of developed 
country populations. As a further reason for excess savings, Summers (2014a) mentions current-account 
surpluses of emerging economies combined with their desire to invest the resulting reserves in safe assets in the 
United States and other developed countries. However, this factor is closely related to distributional changes in 
developed countries (e.g., Kumhof et al, 2012) and therefore is not further addressed here. 
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policy mix has led firms to use their profits for investment in financial assets, rather than 
production facilities, which spurs asset-price bubbles and causes worsening wealth 
distribution (e.g., ILO, 2015). 
While a distinction of causes affecting potential output growth on the one hand and those 
affecting actual output growth on the other hand may be useful for heuristic reasons, there are 
likely to be feedback relationships. This is the case especially if one considers that investment 
responds to the expected return to investment, i.e. that higher expected aggregate demand 
induces investment in productive capacity, and that the low investment rates in developed 
countries over the past five years have shunted their economies into low-growth paths in 
which low aggregate demand growth and low potential output growth have fed back into one 
another. 
A first option for developed countries to deal with the risk of secular stagnation is prolonged 
monetary expansion.
6
 This would reduce the actual real interest rate and, combined with a 
higher inflation target aimed at achieving permanently higher inflation expectations, make a 
zero nominal interest rate correspond to a lower real interest rate. This would address the 
liquidity trap, allow monetary policy to gain back some of its effectiveness and reduce the 
risk of insufficient demand growth causing deflation and further declining demand 
(Krugman, 2014b). However, this strategy has been pursued over the past five years and the 
continued sluggishness in economic recovery indicates that combating insufficient demand 
solely through expansionary monetary policy is insufficient to stimulate real economic 
activity. Instead, it probably undermines financial stability, for example, by increasing risk 
taking of investors searching for yield and making Ponzi schemes more attractive (Summers, 
2014b). Moreover, the distributional effects of the ensuing asset price bubbles tend to 
accentuate, rather than remedy, the insufficiency of aggregate demand. 
A second group of policies addressing secular stagnation aims at raising the level of 
aggregate demand at any given level of the real interest rate. Given the constraints on 
conventional monetary policy and the uncertainty related to unconventional monetary 
expansion, policymakers should use to the fullest extent possible the less uncertain alternative 
                                                 
6
 Some observers propose relying on market forces to address protracted sluggish growth, as macroeconomic 
policy is judged ineffective at best. Instead, policymakers should consider policies designed to stimulate 
productivity growth and labour-force participation to boost investment demand mainly through structural 
reforms, such as improved education and labour mobility, as well as more competition and a more investor-
friendly business climate (e.g. Mokyr, 2014). However, to the extent that the risk of secular stagnation is real, 
following this supply-based strategy will prolong the period of insufficient aggregate demand. 
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policy instrument, i.e. fiscal policy. Complementing expansionary monetary policy by looser 
fiscal policies would aim at both avoiding deflation and facilitating debt deleveraging. Koo 
(2013), for example, suggests combining expansionary monetary policy with countercyclical 
fiscal policy for a period that significantly exceeds the usual temporary, short-term 
dimension. Fiscal expansion should extend until private firms and households have paid 
down debt and repaired their balance sheets, at which point they begin spending normally 
again, and governments could start restoring their own balance sheets and let monetary policy 
be alone in charge of sustaining demand. Concentrating fiscal expansion on increased public 
investment in physical infrastructure (IMF, 2014), would address secular stagnation by 
increasing the rate of current aggregate demand growth and alleviating medium-term supply 
constraints. This proposal asserts that when unemployment is high, as it is in most developed 
countries, the demand stimulus will be greater if investment is paid for by borrowing, rather 
than reducing other spending or raising taxes. Most notably, it asserts that properly designed 
infrastructure investment will reduce rather than increase government debt burdens. 
However, in spite of its sizable potential economic benefits large-scale and/or prolonged 
fiscal stimulus may be politically difficult to adopt, e.g. because of institutional constraints 
related to the European Fiscal Stability Treaty and the debt brake in the German constitution, 
political gridlocks and related budget sequestrations in the United States, and already 
elevated levels of public debt in Japan.
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Another measure would be increasing households’ disposable income to stimulate income-
financed household consumption. This could be achieved by enhanced transfer payments, but 
especially higher (minimum) wages, bringing the long-term unemployed back into work and 
augmenting the participation rate. However, there is no evidence for a sizable increase in 
disposable incomes (e.g., ILO, 2015).  
In the absence of significant demand impulses from government expenditure or household 
disposable income, aggregate demand may be spurred by increased private investment. 
Regarding the United States, the onset of the Great Recession heralded the adoption of a wide 
range of policies whose common objective is to increase private investment for the 
“renaissance of American manufacturing”. These measures target domestic manufacturing 
because of its crucial role in innovation, exports and, especially, the creation of well-paid 
                                                 
7
 Indeed, Germany achieved a balanced budget for 2014 and Japan has reconsidered the phasing in of a sales 
tax, adopted for fiscal consolidation reasons, whose first element capped consumption spending in the second 
and third quarter of 2014 and led the country into recession. 
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jobs (Sperling, 2013). Such initiatives are part of more general measures aimed at redressing 
the decline in well-paid manufacturing jobs, which has been observed for major developed 
countries.
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These measures are closely related to a third measure, i.e. rebalancing the growth pattern by 
“shifting the composition of aggregate demand toward the tradable sector and, specifically, 
toward external demand” that Hlatshwayo and Spence (2014: 274) see as an important part of 
economic recovery in the United States. This could be achieved by further restraint on wage 
growth under the rubric of “boosting competitiveness”, exchange-rate depreciation or through 
trade agreements, including with a view to increasing exports to developing countries. 
Indeed, Edwards and Lawrence (2013: 24) argue that “consensus projections suggest that 
even if the other advanced economies can achieve their full potential growth rates, the 
emerging-market economies will contribute almost 70 percent of global growth over the next 
20 years. This growth should stimulate US exports and reduce the need for adjustment”. 
Taken together, the discussion in this section indicates that developed-country policymakers 
dispose of a wide array of measures to address the risk of secular stagnation. A desirable 
solution would include measures that increase the wage share and disposable personal income 
combined with backing accommodative monetary policy by more expansionary fiscal 
measures. However, in spite of some job creation there is little evidence for wage growth
9
 
and fiscal expansion has been blocked for institutional or political reasons. This means that 
the policy mix combating the risk of secular stagnation is likely to differ across developed 
countries but to include continued easy monetary conditions and a sizable contribution of 
exports to aggregate demand growth, at least partly fuelled by exchange-rate depreciation that 
may be associated with monetary expansion. 
 
 
                                                 
8
 Recent job creation in the United States has largely been confined to low-paying services activities, while the 
share of low-paying part-time jobs in total employment has strongly increased in Germany (ILO, 2015). 
9
 A crucial question for monetary policy is the timing of phasing out monetary expansion and how to interpret 
signals from the labour market in that respect. Recent research for both Europe and the United States suggests 
that the influence on wage and price determination by the long-term unemployed, and in particular by 
discouraged job-seekers and part-time employees who seek full-time work, is considerable lower than that of the 
short-term unemployed, so that the optimal time lag between signals from the labour market indicating 
economic recovery and monetary tightening may have become considerably longer than evidence from past 
economic recoveries would suggest (e.g., Rudebusch and Williams, 2014). 
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3. Does growth in the North determine growth in the South? 
 
(a) Supply-side and demand-side perspectives 
Most models of economic growth would consider the growth rate of the North largely 
irrelevant to the determination of growth in the South. Such models are supply-driven, with 
output growth a function of factor inputs and factor productivity. Reduced growth in the 
developed countries would enter supply-based growth analyses for developing countries only 
through a deterioration of their terms of trade, which would lead to a loss of real income 
though not necessarily slower growth of output volumes, and a decline in market size, which 
would reduce capital accumulation or productivity growth, such as through reduced 
economies of scale at the firm level. Supply-oriented models would base a continuation of 
rapid growth in developing countries primarily on skills upgrading and structural reforms 
designed to develop more efficient ways to produce and deliver goods and services. 
However, the sluggish recovery in developed countries from the global financial crisis has 
revived interest in demand-driven growth. Regarding developed countries, shorter-term 
issues have seen renewed acceptance of the idea that economies often suffer from a lack of 
effective demand and that price adjustments that would correct shortfalls in demand operate 
slowly, if at all. Thus, demand stimulus, such as fiscal expansion, should be used in addition 
to traditional monetary policy and regulatory tools to accelerate economic recovery (e.g., 
Krugman, 2009; Blanchard, Dell’Ariccia and Mauro, 2014). Longer-term issues of demand-
constrained growth in developed countries were discussed in the previous section. 
Some of this renewed acceptance of demand-side growth determinants is reminiscent of the 
traditional argument of development economics that Southern growth depends on Northern 
growth, via Northern demand for Southern exports. Identifying trade as “the engine of 
growth” for developing countries, Lewis (1980) discussed the consequences of what many at 
the time considered a secular decline in the rate of economic growth in developed countries, 
starting in the mid-1970s. He argued that a growth slowdown in developed countries would 
imply lower export opportunities for developing countries and suggested accelerated South-
South trade as an alternative engine of growth. This change in export destination should be 
accompanied by a change in export composition from primary commodities to capital goods. 
To prevent that declining revenues from exports to developed countries slow down 
developing country growth by reducing the funds available for capital goods imports from 
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developed countries, developing-country production and South-South trade of such goods 
should increase substantially. 
Riedel (1984) criticized Lewis (1980) for assuming very limited substitutability between 
tradable goods in developing and developed countries. This assumption reduces the scope for 
developing countries to benefit from relative price effects and engage in price competition to 
expand exports despite the slowdown in developed countries, i.e. by increasing their market 
shares. However, there are limits to the increase in developing countries’ shares on developed 
country markets, as argued by the fallacy-of-composition literature. If, in a situation of 
sluggish import growth in developed countries, all, in particular large, developing countries 
try to substantially increase manufactured exports, they risk rising protective resistance from 
developed countries and/or a deterioration in their terms of trade to such an extent that the 
benefits of larger export volumes is more than offset by lower export prices (see e.g. Mayer, 
2002; Cline, 2010). 
Contrary to both Lewis’ expectations and concerns from the fallacy-of-composition literature, 
the growth slowdown in developed countries was short-lived, their imports from developing 
countries grew rapidly over the two decades prior to 2007, and the attendant increase in the 
proportion of manufactured exports in the composition of developing countries’ aggregate 
demand sustained the role of trade as an engine of growth for developing countries. However, 
this does not invalidate Lewis’ general concern. Rather, the secular-stagnation hypothesis 
implies that developed countries have addressed the growth slowdown that started in the mid-
1970s-1980s by policies that are no longer effective. But distinct from Lewis’ proposal, the 
argument in what follows is that it is the creation of manufacturing capacity, growth of per 
capita incomes and the accumulation of sizable current-account surpluses during the pre-
crisis period of export-led growth that now allow developing countries to focus their response 
to secular stagnation in developed countries on increased domestic demand, especially 
consumption, rather than on expanded production and South-South trade of capital goods that 
probably still are beyond the reach of developing countries. 
 
(b) Southern growth and exports: insights from demand-oriented growth models 
The general revival of interest in demand-based growth determinants and the argument of 
development economics that Southern growth depends on Northern growth, via Northern 
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demand for Southern exports, make it worth looking at two related models in which this link 
can be formally analysed. The first of these models is export-led cumulative causation 
(ELCC) which, following Kaldor (1970), holds that an exogenous increase in export demand, 
especially for manufactures, stimulates investment that leads to faster output growth, allows 
producing with increasing returns of scale and induces technological innovation, thereby 
causing faster productivity growth which, in turn, allows for lower prices and improved 
international competitiveness that further boosts exports. Conversely, reduced exports cause a 
vicious cycle of declining demand, output and productivity growth. Balance-of-payments-
constrained growth (BPCG) models, following Thirlwall (1979), emphasize the need for 
developing countries to export in order to be able to import the machinery, capital equipment 
and technology required for productivity gains and sustained output growth. 
The simplest form of BPCG-models, known as “Thirlwall’s law”, can be expressed as  
(1) 𝑦𝑖 =
η𝑥𝑖𝑦
∗
η𝑚𝑖
 
where yi is the growth rate of developing country i, ηi is the world’s income elasticity of 
demand for exports from country i, ηi is the income elasticity of demand for imports by 
country i, and y* is the rate of world income growth (Thirlwall, 1979). According to equation 
(1), growth in country i is determined by the ratio of export growth to the income elasticity of 
demand for imports. Applied to secular stagnation, the equation implies that developing 
countries that face declining export earnings from protected economic slump in developed 
countries are unable to sustain growth. 
The relationship in equation (1) is subject to a number of assumptions, including a balanced 
trade account, constant relative prices (i.e. purchasing-power parity) and the Marshall-Lerner 
condition being just satisfied (i.e. the sum of the price elasticities of demand for imports and 
exports equals unity), so that the growth of exports is solely determined by the growth of 
world income. One consequence of these assumptions is that ELCC-effects are ruled out. As 
further explained below, this is because cumulative-causation effects from improved price 
competitiveness (i) are small when the price elasticity of export demand is low, (ii) do not 
occur when purchasing-power parity (PPP) holds and nominal exchange-rate appreciation 
crowds out the increase in international competitiveness. 
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Nonetheless, the two traditions share a sufficient number of considerations about the crucial 
role of exports in facilitating demand-led growth for them to be combined when the strong 
assumptions of BPCG-models are relaxed.
10
 Starting with exports, export demand may be 
assumed as determined by the real exchange rate and foreign income, which in terms of 
growth rates can be specified as follows: 
(2) x = εx (e + p
* 
- p) + ηx y
*
 
where x denominates exports; e reflects the nominal exchange rate (measured in home 
currency per unit of foreign currency); p and p
*
 are domestic and foreign price indices, so that 
(e+p
*
-p) represents real exchange-rate depreciation (or the increase in the relative price of 
foreign goods); y
*
 is foreign (i.e. rest of the world) income, and εx and ηx are the price and 
income elasticities of export demand (εx, ηx > 0). 
Foreign price inflation is assumed as exogenous, while domestic price inflation reflects 
changes in unit labour costs and in the gross profit mark-up: 
(3) p = τ + w - q 
where τ is the change in the mark-up over unit labour costs, w is wage inflation, and q is 
labour productivity growth. It may be assumed that τ=0 and that labour productivity growth is 
determined endogenously according to an aggregate version of Verdoorn’s law (i.e. due to 
increasing returns of scale, aggregate labour productivity is a positive function of the pace of 
output growth), so that:  
(4) q = q0 + αy 
where q0 is a shift factor representing autonomous technological change, including as a result 
of technology policies, α represents the Verdoorn effect, and q0, α > 0. 
The growth rate of aggregate demand y is then determined by the weighted average of the 
growth rates of exports and autonomous domestic demand multiplied by the Keynesian 
multiplier λ, i.e. 
(5) y = λ (ωaa + ωxx) 
                                                 
10
 Part of the following account follows Blecker (2013) but also incorporates Moreno-Brid (1998, 1998–1999) 
and Razmi (2011, 2013) who themselves draw on a significant number of earlier contributions. 
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where a is the growth rate of autonomous domestic expenditures and ωa and ωx are the shares 
of domestic expenditures and exports in total demand. In the logic of BPCG-models, exports 
constitute the only demand source that simultaneously relaxes the balance-of-payments 
constraint and stimulates output growth. All the domestic sources of demand would worsen 
the balance of payments because their contribution to output growth would raise imports 
beyond a sustainable level. 
To see this, an import demand function with constant elasticities may be expressed as 
(6) m = - εm (e + p
*
 - p) + ηmy 
where m represents import growth, εm and ηm are the price and income elasticities of import 
demand, and εm, ηm > 0. 
Following McCombie and Thirlwall (1997) and Moreno-Brid (1998, 1998/1999), financial 
flows may be added, to allow for non-zero trade balances. Accordingly, a country’s balance-
of-payments position is assumed to reflect a constant ratio of its trade balance (surplus or 
deficit) relative to national income, where the level at which a trade deficit can be sustained is 
assumed to reflect the degree of confidence by international financial investors.
11
 This 
implies that 
(7) θ (x - y) = e + p* - p + m - y 
where θ is the initial ratio of exports to imports (both measured in domestic currency). Setting 
θ=1 would reflect the traditional assumption of trade balance as a special case. This special 
case is clearly important for developing countries with relatively shallow domestic financial 
markets and little access to international financial markets, while it is less important for 
financially integrated economies. Assuming domestic-demand growth to be constrained by its 
need for imports, reflecting the view that exports are the only truly autonomous source (and, 
by the same token, exogenous constraint) of aggregate demand, it is equation (7) that 
determines the rate of output growth while the rate of domestic expenditure growth a in 
equation (5) becomes endogenous in the long term. 
Substituting equations (2), (3), (4) and (6) into equation (7) and assuming τ=0, i.e. no change 
in mark-ups, yields a very general expression for the BPCG- rate, yB: 
                                                 
11
 To simplify, the trade balance is assumed to equal the current-account balance. 
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(8) 𝑦𝐵 =
(𝜃𝜀𝑥+𝜀𝑚−1)(𝑒+𝑝
∗−𝑤+𝑞0)+𝜃η𝑥𝑦
∗
η𝑚−1+𝜃−𝛼(𝜃𝜀𝑥+𝜀𝑚−1)
 
In addition to Thirlwall’s law, reflected in equation (1), this expression includes a non-zero 
trade balance, which allows for exogenously determined capital flows to loosen or tighten the 
external growth constraint, and an aggregate version of the Verdoorn effect to allow for 
export-led cumulative causation. The latter, in turn, implies assuming PPP not to hold, in 
order to capture effects from changes in international price competitiveness, as well as 
assuming the extended Marshall-Lerner condition to hold, in order to capture effects from the 
price elasticity of exports and imports and preserving the Verdoorn effect in the equation. 
Accordingly, the equation sees real income growth as determined by the rate of expansion of 
the world economy and the income elasticities of exports and imports, as in Thirlwall’s law, 
but also by the initial trade balance and the effects of capital flows, the price elasticities of 
exports and imports, the Verdoorn effect, and terms-of-trade movements. 
Following Moreno-Brid (1998, 1998/1999), the combinations of real income growth (dy/y) 
and import growth (dm/m) that equation (8) reflects may be graphically represented as in 
chart 1. Line B is given by the solutions of equations (2) and (7) and depicts the set of 
combinations of income and import growth consistent with keeping constant the trade deficit 
as a proportion of income. In this case, changes in income growth are sustainable if: 
(9) d(dy/y)/dt = σ (dm/m - θηxdy
*
/y
*
- (εxθ+1)(dp/p - dp
*
/p
*
) - (1-θ) dy/y)), with σ > 0 
Its slope is equal to (1-θ), i.e. not greater than one and positive (as in chart 1) when the trade 
account is in deficit. Depicting it with a positive intercept reflects a situation of constant 
terms of trade and an expanding world economy. Points below (above) line B have a 
decreasing (increasing) ratio of the trade deficit relative to income. 
Line Q is the graph of the import demand function given by equation (6) and shows the 
minimum increase in imports required for any given rate of output growth. Such a minimum 
increase is sustainable if: 
(10) d(dm/m)/dt = φ (dm/m + εm(dp/p - dp
*
/p
*
) – ηmdy/y)), with φ < 0. 
Its slope reflects the income elasticity of imports, assumed to exceed (1-θ), and becomes 
steeper, for example, the more a country relies on import-intensive processing exports rather 
than on exports with a high domestic value-added content. The slope of line Q must exceed 
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that of line B if economic growth faces a balance-of-payments constraint. Its intercept at the 
origin mirrors the assumption of constant terms of trade. To the right (left) of Q the growth 
path of real income is associated with a decreasing (increasing) import-income ratio. The 
intersection of lines B and Q determines the growth rates of real income and real imports 
consistent with a constant ratio of the trade deficit relative to income. 
Chart 1: Effects of secular stagnation in developed countries on developing country growth 
 
Source: Author’s elaborations on Moreno-Brid (1998 and 1998/1999). 
Deterioration in a developing country’s external economic environment associated with 
secular stagnation in developed countries has the following effects. First, a deterioration of 
the terms of trade, such as resulting for natural resource-rich economies from an exogenous 
decline in commodity prices, causes a parallel downward shift of lines B and Q to B’ and Q’ 
(i.e. the two dotted lines in the figure) with the final growth effect depending on the initial 
export-import ratio and the price elasticities of imports and exports, as specified in equation 
(9). Second, a slowdown in global economic growth results in a downward shift of line B to 
B’’ (i.e. the grey line with short dashes in the figure) for two reasons: (i) in the logic of 
BPCG-models, lower export revenues cause reduced imports of machinery and capital 
equipment and the ensuing lower investment growth reduces output growth; and (ii) contrary 
to the canonical BPCG-model, assuming PPP not to hold and the extended Marshall-Lerner 
condition to hold, so that the variables specified in equation 4 do not drop out of equation 8, 
export-related cumulative causation forces are allowed to work: if export demand declines, 
Q
B'''
Q'
B
B'
B''
dy/y
dm/m
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capacity utilization will decline. This will lead to a decline in productivity growth to the 
extent that the Verdoorn effect is endogenous to the rate of capacity utilization. Hence, the 
economy’s pace of growth decelerates unless an alternative source of demand can be found. 
However, greater reliance on that alternative source of growth should not cause an increase in 
the income elasticity of imports, as this would lead to a counter-clockwise rotation in line Q 
(determined by equation (10)) and, unless counterbalanced by changes in other parameters or 
exogenous variables, lead to a decline in the balance-of-payments constrained growth rate. 
Third, a reversal of capital flows, e.g. caused by a decline in international financial investors’ 
confidence in the country’s growth prospects, e.g. if the country becomes a net capital 
exporter, makes line B shift from upward to downward sloping and move to B’’’ (i.e. the 
grey line with long dashes in the chart). 
Some of these effects may not occur, or be reversed, depending on the kind of policies 
developed countries adopt to address the risk of secular stagnation (discussed in section 2). 
First, measures that increase disposable income of developed country households and 
stimulate income-financed consumption would increase sustainable capacity utilization and 
hence private investment. The attendant growth effects would support demand for developing 
country exports, even though probably not at levels of the pre-crisis period when much of 
developed-country consumption was debt financed. However, the discussion in section 2 
suggests that such an outcome is unlikely. Second, the deterioration of the terms of trade 
would be (partially) compensated by fiscal expansion concentrated on infrastructure 
investment, as the relatively high raw-material content of infrastructure investment would 
increase the consumption of industrial metals and energy and support the international prices 
of these commodities. This effect would be reinforced if developing countries, especially 
China, maintain a high rate of urbanization and associated infrastructure investment even 
with reduced export prospects. 
Third, prolonged monetary expansion in developed countries would probably maintain large 
capital flows to developing countries in search of higher returns and allow for an elevated 
level of developing countries’ income ratio of the trade deficit that international financial 
investor judge sustainable. These flows can maintain the BPCG-rate at an elevated pace as 
the net inflow of capital from abroad can be used, instead of export revenues, to pay for 
imports. However, it will not suspend the external growth constraint over an extended period 
of time if the associated repayment schedules imply a continuous increase in the income ratio 
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of capital inflows, i.e. a situation which will eventually undermine international investors’ 
confidence. 
 
4. Maintaining rapid growth in the South despite secular stagnation in the North: changing 
assumptions and policies 
The previous section examined how secular stagnation in developed countries may affect 
developing countries’ output growth. This section considers how developing countries can 
maintain output expansion even in a less favourable external economic environment. The first 
part relaxes the assumptions of traditional BPCG-models that make exports the only 
autonomous source of demand and block cumulative causation forces and, instead, argues 
that technology shifts and cumulative-causation effects can result from domestic-demand 
growth without increasing the import elasticity of demand or causing the income share of the 
trade deficit to become unsustainable. The second part discusses attendant policy changes.   
 
(a) Changing assumptions 
Traditional BPCG-models exclude relative price effects and cumulative causation by 
assuming either or both the extended Marshall-Lerner condition not to hold and PPP to hold. 
The validity of these assumptions is largely an empirical question, where results are mixed 
and depend on the chosen countries, time periods and empirical techniques. But it seems 
reasonable to conclude that price elasticities increase over time and satisfy the extended 
Marshall-Lerner condition, such as through J-curve effects, and that PPP is more likely to 
hold among structurally similar countries and over the very long run.
12
 Accordingly, relative 
price effects, technology shifts and cumulative causation may well play a role in a North-
South setting in the short to medium term, so that output growth is no longer just a function 
of developed country growth, developing countries’ income elasticities of demand for exports 
and imports and the level of the trade deficit that these countries can sustain. 
                                                 
12
 The literature review by Bahmani, Harvey and Hegerty (2013) concludes that supportive evidence for the 
Marshall-Lerner condition to hold is much weaker than commonly thought. However, the review mainly refers 
to developed countries. It is well-known that for these countries intra-industry trade plays an important role, as 
well as that non-price factors are crucial for such trade. It is also important to note the widespread perception 
that exchange-rate undervaluation is an effective industrial policy in tradable goods sectors of developing 
countries. This suggests that their exports are price sensitive, which provides prima facie evidence for the 
Marshall-Lerner condition to hold. 
18 
 
Relaxing the assumption that the extended Marshall-Lerner condition does not hold and, 
instead, allowing relative price effects to play a role, exports cease to be the only exogenous 
driver of demand and both exports and domestic demand are sources of output growth (see 
also Razmi, 2013). Recognizing that, via the technology shift factor and the Verdoorn effect, 
an increase in domestic investment simultaneously raises aggregate demand and labour 
productivity, labour productivity growth improves international price competitiveness. If 
exports are price elastic, this competitiveness effect raises exports and alleviates any balance-
of-payments constraint that the initial increase in investment may have caused. Hence, 
whether or not domestic-demand growth based on increased investment worsens the balance-
of-payments position depends on the import elasticity of investment. 
But exchange-rate changes also play a role. Also relaxing the assumption that PPP holds, and 
instead assuming fully flexible exchange rates, implies that any growth in exports from 
cumulative causation that exceeds the increase in imports triggered by growing investment 
will be crowded out to keep the income ratio of the trade account unchanged (or, in the 
absence of capital flows, balanced). This may occur through exchange-rate appreciation, or a 
rise in domestic prices (such as from real wage growth in excess of productivity growth). In 
reality, countries are unlikely to adopt free floating and growth effects will result from 
cumulative causation and global income growth to the extent that managed floating succeeds 
in maintaining at least part of the increase in international competitiveness. 
To further examine the output effects of labour productivity growth, the implicit assumption 
of BPCG-models that foreign and domestic goods are imperfect substitutes may be relaxed.
13
 
Assuming instead that importables (exportables) are also produced (consumed) domestically, 
an exchange-rate appreciation will worsen the external balance due to substitution effects 
between importables and exportables on both the supply and demand side. The size of these 
effects will depend on exchange-rate flexibility and the country’s pattern of specialization. 
More importantly, labour productivity growth resulting from technology shifts and/or the 
Verdoorn effects may have positive or negative impacts on a country’s BPCG, depending 
partly on whether that technological progress responds to domestic-demand or export growth, 
and partly on the country’s economic structure. To see this, equation (8) may be extended by 
disaggregating the shift factor representing autonomous technological change (q0) into the 
                                                 
13
 Razmi (2011) provides a detailed discussion of the algebra of these effects, though with a different focus. The 
spirit of assuming substitutability is similar to that in Riedel’s (1984) criticism of Lewis (1980). 
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BPCG-effect stemming from the export sector, which depends on the size of the technology 
advance and the share of exports in total demand and may be denoted as qxωx, and that related 
to domestic demand (i.e. qaωa). Similarly, the size of the Verdoorn effect (α) depends on 
whether it responds to export or domestic-demand growth and on the relative size of these 
two elements of aggregate demand, i.e. αxωx for exports and αaωa for domestic demand. 
Moreover, the impact on BPCG of export and domestic-demand growth also depends on the 
import elasticity of demand of these two elements, i.e. ηmxωx for exports and ηmaωa for 
domestic demand. How this disaggregation affects BPCG can be expressed as follows: 
(11) 𝑦𝐵′ =
(𝜃𝜀𝑥+𝜀𝑚−1)(𝑒+𝑝
∗−𝑤+(𝑞𝑥𝜔𝑥+𝑞𝑎𝜔𝑎))+𝜃η𝑥𝑦
∗
(η𝑚𝑥𝜔𝑥+η𝑚𝑎𝜔𝑎)−1+𝜃−(𝛼𝑥𝜔𝑥+𝛼𝑎𝜔𝑎)(𝜃𝜀𝑥+𝜀𝑚−1)
 
Concentrating on domestic-demand growth, equation (11) indicates that a rebalancing from 
export to domestic-demand growth maintains the pace of BPCG if the import elasticity of 
domestic demand does not exceed that of exports (ηmaωa ≤ ηmxωx) or make the trade deficit as a 
proportion of income (θ) unsustainable, and if labour productivity growth from technology 
shifts and Verdoorn effects of growing domestic demand are at least as strong as those from 
exports (qaωa, αaωa ≥ qxωx, αxωx > 0). The direction and strength of these effects are determined 
by relative price effects (assuming θεx+εm>1), changes in the size of output, and changes in 
the exchange rate and wages. 
 
(b) Changing policies 
This section examines the policy changes required to achieve the changes in the import 
elasticity of demand and in labour productivity growth that could compensate for lower 
export growth by faster domestic-demand growth. 
Differences in the import elasticity of the different demand components imply that changed 
proportions of exports and domestic demand – and of household consumption, government 
expenditure and investment in domestic demand – determine changes in the import elasticity 
of aggregate demand growth. These relations depend on a country’s economic structure. The 
import elasticity of exports is likely to be highest for countries that are strongly involved in 
processing trade, and lowest for commodity exporters. The import elasticity of domestic 
demand is generally lowest for government consumption, while the import content of 
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investment and household consumption depends on a country’s industrial development, i.e. 
the extent to which its production structure matches the emerging composition of 
consumption and is sufficiently advanced to produce machinery and capital equipment. 
Export-led growth allows financing required capital-goods imports from export earnings. A 
rebalanced growth strategy needs to find alternative sources. First, remaining export earnings 
could be used. Second, developing countries’ foreign-exchange reserves from current-
account surpluses during the export-led growth period appear outsized relative to a variety of 
traditional metrics, such as months of imports and short-term external liabilities. Tapping into 
these reserves could finance capital-goods imports for a significant period of time on average, 
though certain individual countries would rapidly face constraints. Third, development banks 
could intermediate concessionary lending from countries with large to those with few 
foreign-exchange reserves. The New Development Bank recently established by the BRICS 
could play a crucial role here.
14
 Fourth, another source is remittances from migrants that 
developed countries may welcome to slow down the decline of their labour force also in the 
form of high-skilled workers that originate from other than the least-developed countries. 
Finally, less risky forms of foreign finance, such as foreign direct investment, long-term 
bonds denominated in local currency and/or with repayment schedules that alter in the event 
of pre-specified contingencies could also be used. However, in terms of the borrowing 
country’s balance sheet, the income-generating capital on the asset side must match the 
interest, dividend and amortization payment commitments generated on the liability side.
15
 
The viability of using such alternative sources to finance capital-goods imports depends on 
two elements. First, the foreign capital lending must be used to create real capital, i.e. for 
investment that ensures growth so that the share of foreign lending in GDP does not rise and 
the repayment profile of lending does not deteriorate. If, instead, capital inflows create 
financial capital by raising asset prices in the real-estate and equity markets, ensuing wealth 
effects may allow consumers to expand debt-financed consumption. This would lift output 
through the contribution of domestic consumption to aggregate demand growth. But it would 
do so through increased debt rather than increased income, causing vulnerabilities related to 
rapid domestic credit expansion, exchange-rate appreciation and excessive financial-market 
                                                 
14
 Enhanced South-South and regional monetary integration could play an important role in growth rebalancing, 
but this issue goes beyond the scope of this paper. 
15
 For detailed discussion of this issue, see Kregel (2004). 
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volatility that in the event of a capital-flow reversal need to be combatted by tighter 
macroeconomic policies with adverse growth effects. 
Second, the sustainability of using such alternative sources also depends on the amount of 
required capital-goods imports, the availability of foreign exchange from remittances and 
remaining exports, and the maturity and repayment structure of any required loans. 
Addressing these two elements, may involve policies, such as specific incentive schemes, that 
ensure that the new investment match the requirements for producing consumer goods in 
sectors with cumulative causation effects, as well as some control over the amount of capital 
that enters the country and its performance conditions. 
Turning to labour productivity, most positive effects stem from fixed capital investment (with 
the remainder resulting from human-capital development). The autonomous element of 
investment is generally low and mainly reflects replacing obsolete machinery, as well as 
public investment following fiscal expansion. The bulk of investment responds to expected 
higher earnings from higher expected sales and profits raising the marginal efficiency of 
capital. With reduced prospects for export growth, expected expansion of household 
consumption becomes a key driver of investment, for two reasons. 
First, household consumption is the largest component of domestic demand. In most 
developing countries, household consumption accounts for half to two-third of aggregate 
demand so that even a relatively small proportional increase in household consumption 
makes a significant contribution to aggregate demand growth. To illustrate the importance of 
these proportions, it is useful to recall that in China, where the share of household 
consumption in GDP has been only about 36 per cent over the past decade, net exports 
contributed 2.3 percentage points and household consumption 4.1 percentage points to the 
growth rate of GDP of 14.2 per cent in 2007, i.e. the year before the great trade collapse. 
Assuming government expenditure and investment to remain unchanged, this means that the 
absolute amount of household consumption would have needed to grow by slightly more than 
half of any decline in net exports in order to maintain GDP-growth at the pace of 2007. This 
would have corresponded to roughly 5 per cent of total household consumption expenditure 
in 2007, compared to an actual increase in household consumption spending by 8.5 per cent 
between 2006 and 2007. 
Second, the composition of household consumption can drive investment in large-scale 
manufacturing. Developing countries’ rapid income growth over the past two decades has 
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allowed many of them to attain levels of per capita income where consumer demand shifts 
from basic necessities, such as food, to discretionary items, such as manufactured consumer 
goods. The largest among these countries are approaching levels of domestic purchasing 
power that can generate sufficiently large and rapidly rising domestic demand for such 
consumer goods. This would allow domestic manufacturers to deepen the division of labour 
and realize increasing returns to scale and growing labour productivity, generating much the 
same process of cumulative causation as emphasized by ELCC-models. Indeed, more general 
cumulative causation models, such as Hirschman (1958) and Myrdal (1957), emphasize 
diversified growth strategies and argue that net exports are only one source of demand for 
manufactures. Growth in consumption will generate cumulative causation effects similar to 
those from exports provided that the attendant investment and output growth allows 
producing with increasing returns to scale and induces productivity growth. Post-Keynesian 
consumption theory holds that the income elasticity of consumer demand is subject to 
threshold effects and empirical estimates suggest that a range of developing countries 
currently are at levels of per capita income where this elasticity increases rapidly (Mayer, 
2013b). Enhanced South-South integration could further enhance the market size for 
developing country producers. 
Investment is likely to respond to rising domestic consumption especially in those developing 
countries that have followed an export-led strategy. These countries master large-scale 
manufacturing activities but, emphasizing developed countries as destination markets, their 
production structure is strongly influenced by the preferences of consumers with a relatively 
high level of per capita income. Meeting domestic-demand growth will need to take into 
account that consumers in developing countries have lower levels of disposable income and, 
hence, will demand goods with lower prices but also accept lower levels of product quality. 
Resulting domestic production in the less-sophisticated market segments of such consumer 
goods is unlikely to face stiff competition from imports because consumers are mostly 
concerned about price, rather than quality, and developed country firms do not usually 
compete in these segments.
16
 Accordingly, the import elasticity of demand from this type of 
domestic-demand growth is probably low and reduces the aggregate import elasticity of 
demand, thereby allowing for higher BPCG. By contrast, middle-range market segments of 
consumer goods tend to see significant competition between developed and developing 
                                                 
16
 Stiff competition is also unlikely in the upper-range market segments where the brand names of developed 
country producers are important. 
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country firms because developing country firms can sufficiently improve the quality of their 
goods and developed country firms can sufficiently reduce their production costs to compete 
in these segments.
17
 Hence, stimulating domestic investment to build competitive production 
in these segments will be more challenging. 
Regarding technology-shift, there is little reason to believe that innovation designed to 
provide affordable access to new goods tailored to the needs of lower-middle-income 
consumers generates less technological progress than innovation targeting more expensive 
standardized goods for export.
18
 But the size of productivity gains from domestic-demand 
growth crucially depends on the Verdoorn effects, which are determined by output growth 
and attendant cumulative causation. The net impact on productivity gains from Verdoorn 
effects resulting from growth rebalancing partly depends on the loss of productivity gains 
from reduced export growth. Manufacturing firms that export are generally more productive 
than non-exporting firms. However, there is strong theoretical support (e.g., Redding, 2011) 
and significant empirical evidence (e.g., Wagner, 2012) indicating that only relatively few 
firms are directly involved in trade and that high productivity is a pre-condition for export 
participation, rather than its outcome. It is self-selection that makes more productive firms 
engage in export activities, as it is only those firms that can absorb the additional sunk costs 
associated with learning about demand and setting up distribution networks on export 
markets. Once such already highly productive firms engage in exporting, they may further 
improve productivity through learning effects. However, “there is little evidence supporting 
‘learning-by-exporting’” effects (WTO, 2013: 87). 
Two additional results from the empirical literature are noteworthy. First, some studies 
indicate that the size of any learning-by-exporting effects depends on the income level and 
market size of the destination country. Exporters adjust the quality of their products across 
destinations by varying the quality of their inputs, so that productivity gains are persistently 
higher for firms that export higher-quality goods to high-income and larger countries 
(Manova and Zhang, 2012). This would signal a substantial loss of Verdoorn effects from 
reduced prospects for exports to developed countries. However, second, most of the benefits 
from productivity increases after export entry are passed on to buyers in the form of lower 
prices (Marin and Voigtländer, 2013). This finding suggests that productivity increases from 
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 For more detailed discussion of market segmentations in consumer goods, see Mayer (2013a). 
18
 While there is a lacuna of empirical work on this issue, the related literature on inclusive innovation (e.g., 
Chataway, Hanlin and Kaplinsky, 2013) supports this perspective. 
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growing exports do generally not transform into higher profits that could be used for further 
investment, which would be how Verdoorn effects are reflected. But it also means that 
Verdoorn effects in middle-range goods produced for domestic markets may well be positive, 
provided that productivity growth is allowed to translate into higher profits and investment 
rather than lower prices.
19
 
Moreover, positive Verdoorn effects are likely to occur from the less-sophisticated market 
segment. Here, new products would be produced so that domestic producers may face rising 
expectations from domestic consumers that could engender learning effects similarly to those 
from exports to developed countries.
20
 Such Verdoorn effects would combine with positive 
technology-shift effects and be akin to a non-tradables sector with faster productivity gains 
relative to the tradables sector. These gains tend to cause exogenous real exchange rate 
depreciation in equation (8). Allowing relative price effects to work, the attendant 
substitution effects will further reduce the import elasticity of demand. 
Whether productivity growth from domestic-demand growth eventually lowers or raises 
BPCG also depends on exchange-rate movements and wage growth relative to productivity 
growth. As illustrated in equation (11), any productivity growth in the exportables sector can 
translate into increased international competitiveness and faster export growth only if it is not 
eroded by currency appreciation or wage increases. The same holds for productivity growth 
in the importables sector, with one important difference. The proportion of productivity 
growth in least-sophisticated market segments, combined with their size, and that of the 
middle-range market segments determines the size of real exchange rate depreciation and the 
changes in competition caused by an increase in domestic consumer demand. If this 
proportion is large, exchange-rate changes and domestic wage growth will have little adverse 
effects on the competitiveness of domestic producers in middle-range market segments and 
the positive effect of domestic demand growth on the BPCG will be relatively large. By 
contrast, if the proportion is small, any exchange-rate appreciation or domestic wage growth 
will cause a leakage of domestic demand growth to imports. While exchange-rate 
management can contain this leakage, wage effects are more difficult to manage. This is 
because wages are not only a cost element but also a driver of disposable income and hence 
consumer demand. Indeed, an increase in wages commensurate to average aggregate 
                                                 
19
 One way to make this possible without losing price competitiveness vis-à-vis foreign suppliers is through 
exchange-rate policy.  
20
 Findings that R&D-spending is pro-cyclical (e.g. Barlevy, 2007) indicate that striving for productivity growth, 
such as through the development of new products, may well respond to expected demand growth. 
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productivity growth will be necessary to ensure that domestic demand growth is driven by 
income rather than debt-financed consumption. On the other hand, productivity growth of 
innovative firms in middle-range market segments cannot be fully translated into wage 
growth in order to prevent an erosion of their increase in international competitiveness. But 
fiscal measures can increase the non-wage elements of disposable income and purchasing 
power of workers in these firms. 
The effects associated with the above discussion may be illustrated by chart 2. The real 
exchange rate depreciation stemming from productivity gains in less-sophisticated consumer-
good segments imply a parallel downward shift of lines B and Q to B’ and Q’. The slope of 
Q’ is flatter than that of Q because the import elasticity of demand decreases as there is little 
substitutability between domestically produced and imported goods in this sector. The 
substitution effects in the middle-range market segment reduce the slope of the import 
demand function further, and line Q’ moves towards line Q’’ but the extent of this move from 
consumer goods will be tempered by a potential increase in the income elasticity of import 
demand from capital goods. The slopes of lines B and B’ are identical, assuming capital-
account and exchange-rate management to succeed in maintaining exchange-rate stability at 
its new, depreciated level. Overall, the import elasticity of demand falls for any given growth 
rate. This indicates that developing countries could maintain rapid growth in spite of secular 
stagnation in developed countries. 
Chart 2: Potential effects of a rebalancing of developed countries’ growth strategy on their balance-of-
payments constrained growth rate 
 
Source: Author’s elaboration. 
Q
Q'
B
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Benefitting from these effects will be complicated to the extent that developed countries 
address the risk of secular stagnation by increasing their exports to developing countries, 
through competitiveness effects stemming from wage restraint or exchange-rate depreciation 
or through gains in market access from trade agreements. However, such an outcome would 
not be sustainable because developed countries would not address the roots of secular 
stagnation and developing countries would be unable to create the income and require 
purchasing developed-country goods from borrowing. Indeed, this outcome would risk 
putting the global economy, rather than just developed countries, at risk of secular stagnation. 
 
5. Conclusions 
There remains considerable controversy over why economic recovery from the 2007–2008 
crisis has remained so sluggish across the main developed countries. If it reflects a sustained 
lack of aggregate demand, i.e. secular stagnation, developing countries cannot maintain rapid 
growth based on export-led strategies. 
Demand-based growth models indicate that developing countries can sustain rapid growth by 
compensating for lower export growth by faster domestic-demand growth, provided that they 
can also reduce the import elastictity of demand. One way of achieving this is accelerating 
investment in consumer-good sectors that are sufficiently large to allow for rapid productivity 
growth from cumulative causation. Capital-account and exchange-rate management needs to 
avoid erosion of the associated gains in international competitiveness through currency 
appreciation. Wage growth should be commensurate to average aggregate productivity gains 
to finance domestic-demand growth through income growth, rather than borrowing, but 
cannot fully compensate productivity gains of the most innovative firms to prevent an erosion 
of their gains in international competitiveness through wage inflation. Fiscal measures can 
increase the non-wage elements of disposable income and further raise consumers’ 
purchasing power. 
The extent to which growth rebalancing is successful partly depends on an economy’s size 
and economic structure. Small economies are unlikely to attain sufficiently rapid output 
growth to benefit from cumulative-causation effects on the basis of domestic-demand growth, 
so that an increase in their market size through South-South integration is of critical 
importance. Resource-based economies will also find it challenging to rapidly create large 
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manufacturing activities. But to the extent that commodity prices remain at historically 
elevated levels, these countries will continue enjoying a relatively favourable external 
economic environment, giving them more time for economic restructuring. 
The success of growth rebalancing also depends on how developed countries address the risk 
of secular stagnation. While policymakers dispose of a wide array of measures, continued 
monetary expansion and a sizable contribution of exports, including to developing countries, 
are likely to play important roles. Monetary expansion is likely to trigger capital flows to 
developing countries which, for developed countries, would be associated with declining real 
exchange rates, increased competitiveness, and increased export demand. Demand for 
developed-country exports may be further strengthened through trade agreements. The result 
for developing countries would be the risk that any acceleration of domestic-demand growth 
causes an increase in the import elasticity of demand, reflected by growing imports. 
Expanding domestic production in order to allow domestic-demand growth be financed 
through growing income, rather than borrowing, would become very difficult. Hence, 
developing countries may be well advised to combine accelerated investment in large 
consumer-good sectors with capital-account and exchange-rate management to contain 
capital inflows and, more generally, to manage currency values to maintain competitiveness. 
Drawing down outsized foreign-exchange reserves and obtaining concessionary loans from 
development banks could finance needed capital-goods imports. All of these policies are 
fraught with uncertainties and risks. Yet, the alternative may be secular stagnation globally. 
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